Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law

Research Centers & Programs

2018

The Legal Basis for IMO Climate Measures
Aoife O'Leary
Jennifer Brown

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sabin_climate_change
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

THE LEGAL BASES FOR IMO
CLIMATE MEASURES

By Aoife O’Leary and Jennifer Brown
June 2018

© 2018 Environmental Defense Fund. All Rights Reserved.
The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law develops legal techniques to fight climate change,
trains law students and lawyers in their use, and provides the legal profession and the public
with up-to-date resources on key topics in climate law and regulation. It works closely with the
scientists at Columbia University's Earth Institute and with a wide range of governmental, nongovernmental and academic organizations.

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law
Columbia Law School
435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10027
Tel: +1 (212) 854-3287
Email: columbiaclimate@gmail.com
Web: http://www.ColumbiaClimateLaw.com
Twitter: @ColumbiaClimate
Blog: http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange

Disclaimer: This paper is the responsibility of the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law and the
Environmental Defense Fund, and does not reflect the views of Columbia Law School or Columbia
University. This paper is an academic study provided for informational purposes only and does not
constitute legal advice. Transmission of the information is not intended to create, and the receipt does not
constitute, an attorney-client relationship between sender and receiver. No party should act or rely on
any information contained in this White Paper without first seeking the advice of an attorney.

About the authors: Aoife O’Leary is a Legal Analyst at Environmental Defense Fund Europe.
Jennifer Brown is a Senior Research Assistant at Environmental Defense Fund Europe.
Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank Dorota Lost-Sieminska and Edmund
Hughes of the International Maritime Organization; Katharine Palmer and Motonobu Tsuchiya
of Lloyd’s Register; Prof. Joanne Scott of the European University Institute; Peter Hinchliffe of
the International Chamber of Shipping; Gillian Grant, the Alternate Permanent Representative
of Canada to the IMO; Michael Gerrard of Columbia Law School and Annie Petsonk, Bryony
Worthington and Britt Groosman of the Environmental Defense Fund for their comments on
earlier drafts of this paper. All errors are the authors’ own.

The Legal Bases for IMO Climate Measures

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper investigates the potential legal bases for the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) to enact climate measures. It finds that the IMO has broad powers to enact almost any
required measure, and quickly via a tacit amendment to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).
The Convention on the International Maritime Organization establishes the IMO and gives it
very broad objectives and powers to achieve those objectives. The objectives include the “prevention
and control of marine pollution from ships.” The powers to achieve this objective include the
drafting of conventions, agreements or other suitable instruments, and performing functions related
to the objectives of the IMO. The powers are very broad and nowhere limit the type of marine
pollution that the IMO Convention covers to exclude emissions of greenhouse gases. Indeed, state
practice both within the IMO and in wider climate venues such as the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) confirm that members of the IMO interpret the term
“marine pollution” to encompass greenhouse gases.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) codified the rights and
responsibilities of countries with regard to the world’s oceans. Though it does not primarily
regulate shipping, there are sections which overlap with IMO regulations and relate to marine
pollution from shipping. A careful examination of those articles and how they relate to the IMO
underscores that from the perspective of international law and institutions, while UNCLOS may
also have competence to address greenhouse gases, UNCLOS Parties look to the IMO to regulate
greenhouse gases.
This broad power of the IMO allows for economic measures or the establishment of an
independent body to advise on the climate transition. Part XIII of the IMO Convention sets out the
budgetary powers of the IMO but relates solely to internal IMO matters and nowhere prohibits the
adoption of economic measures by the IMO.
Once the power of the IMO to adopt economic measures or an independent body is
established, the next question is what vehicle should be utilized. Climate measures should be legally
binding, enforceable and implemented on a global scale as quickly as possible, as the climate crisis is
urgent. The final section of this paper examines several options: the adoption of an entirely new
treaty; the adoption of an entirely new agreement or other suitable instrument; or amending an
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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already existing instrument. While all are possible, amending an existing instrument, most likely
MARPOL, in the case of greenhouse gases, is the best option to ensure the fastest entry into force of
the agreed measures, while also ensuring they are legally binding, enforceable and implemented
globally.
There are two avenues for amending an existing annex to MARPOL, the “rejected unless
accepted” procedure and the “accepted unless rejected” or tacit amendment procedure. The choice
between the two procedures is purely a political decision and can be taken by the committee in
which the proposed amendments are being discussed. The tacit amendment procedure can be
utilized for the adoption of any amendments to an existing annex that do not go beyond the scope
of the annex or MARPOL itself. The urgency of the climate crisis requires that the members of the
IMO adopt effective climate measures by the tacit amendment procedure as soon as possible.

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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1. INTRODUCTION
In April 2018, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted an initial strategy for
the reduction of greenhouse gases from ships.1 The question now is, what policies and measures
will the IMO implement to meet the goals set out in this strategy? This paper examines the
foundational documents establishing the IMO and its Marine Environment Protection Committee
(MEPC), the history of these bodies, and the broader legal context in which they operate, to
address three questions: first, whether the IMO has legal competence to address greenhouse gases;
second, whether the IMO has legal capacity to adopt measures such as: introducing a climate fund
to support low carbon technologies or a carbon pricing measure (referred to as economic measures
in this paper) or setting up an independent body to assist with climate governance; and third, how
the IMO may institute these measures, e.g., via an amendment to an existing treaty such as the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), adoption of an
entirely new treaty, or adoption of other legal instruments.

2. IMO LEGAL COMPETENCE ON GREENHOUSE GASES
In establishing the IMO, countries came together and vested certain powers in the IMO.
The power of the IMO to do anything derives from these powers as vested in it by its members and
laid down in the Convention of the International Maritime Organization (the “IMO Convention”).
Therefore, in considering what powers the IMO has, the first place to turn is the IMO Convention.

2.1 The IMO Convention
The IMO Convention was agreed in Geneva on March 6, 1948.2 It established the IMO (at
that time called the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization or IMCO). Article 1 of
the Convention provides that the purpose of the Organization is, inter alia:
To provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of
governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds
'UN Body Adopts Climate Change Strategy for Shipping' (IMO, 2018)
<http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/06greenhousegasesinitialstrategy.aspx>
accessed 18 April 2018.
2 Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 1948, Article 1.
1
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affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate the
general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning the
maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine
pollution from ships; and to deal with administrative and legal matters related to the
purposes set out in this Article.
The Convention further empowers and requires the Organization to undertake specific steps to
achieve these aims:
[T]he Organization shall: consider and make recommendations… Provide for the
drafting of conventions, agreements, or other suitable instruments, and recommend
these to governments and to intergovernmental organizations, and convene such
conferences as may be necessary; … Perform functions arising in connection with
[the above activities], in particular those assigned to it by or under international
instruments relating to maritime matters and the effect of shipping on the marine
environment.3
These powers are very broad and nowhere limit the type of marine pollution that can be tackled to
exclude greenhouse gases. Nor anywhere are the types of measures that can be taken limited
(detailed further below), nor does the Convention limit certain types of measures to dealing with
certain types of issues. Therefore, the Convention contains no explicit or implicit restriction on the
types of measures that can be adopted nor does it restrict the types of marine pollution that the
IMO can act to tackle.

2.2 The Practice of Regulating Greenhouse Gases in the IMO
When the IMO Convention was adopted in 1948, climate change had not yet become a
widespread concern. For several reasons, it is now clear that the “marine pollution” over which the
IMO has been given competence includes greenhouse gases. First, as noted above, the term
“marine pollution” is extremely broad; nothing in the Convention provides a narrower definition
that might exclude greenhouse gases; and neither the Organization nor any of its committees
(detailed further below) has ever taken a decision limiting the term to exclude greenhouse gases.
Second, the practice of the Organization and the MEPC has been to take steps – albeit
incomplete ones – to address greenhouse gases from international shipping (for example, through

3

Convention on the International Maritime Organization 1948, Article 2.
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the adoption of the Energy Efficiency Design Index4), demonstrating that the Members interpret
the term “marine pollution” as encompassing these pollutants. In September 1997, the
Organization convened an International Air Pollution Conference and, by Resolution, the member
states invited the MEPC to begin work on CO2 reduction strategies.5
Third, in December 1997, after the IMO adopted Resolution 8, the Conference of the Parties
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) unanimously
adopted the Kyoto Protocol, Article 2.2 of which specified that work on this topic should be
pursued (non-exclusively) in the IMO.6 While the decision of the UNFCCC is not probative as to
the competence of the IMO, it is evidence of states’ views. All member states of the IMO are also
member states of the Kyoto Protocol, except for the United States.
Article 38 of the IMO Convention specifically authorizes the MEPC to “perform such
functions as are or may be conferred upon the Organization by or under other international
conventions for the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships.” While the UNFCCC is
not a “convention for the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships,” Article 38
foresaw the need for this type of inter-convention cooperation. Furthermore, in December 1997,
when the UNFCCC adopted Article 2.2, every IMO ember state was also a party to the UNFCCC
and accepted Article 2.2’s directive to pursue control of these emissions in IMO, lends credence to
the view that the IMO member states themselves regard addressing greenhouse gases as within
the ambit of their Convention.

2.3 IMO Interaction with the UNFCCC
In the two decades since the UNFCCC adopted Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC
Parties have continued to report their maritime international “bunker fuel” greenhouse gas
'Energy Efficiency Measures' (IMO, 2018)
<http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Technical-andOperational-Measures.aspx> accessed 18 May 2018.
5 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, Resolution MP/CONF.3/35 (22
October 1997).
6 See Article 2.2 of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, to which
there were no state reservations and states, “The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or
reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and
marine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International
Maritime Organization, respectively.“ Moreover, the IMO Convention authorizes the Organization to work
in co-operation with other international organizations in Article 60.
4
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emissions to the UNFCCC, in a separate category from their domestic emissions, in keeping with
the Good Practice Guidance for Greenhouse Gases Inventory Reporting promulgated by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.7 The IMO has also provided to the UNFCCC regular
reports on the Organization’s progress in addressing these emissions. 8 The fact that states
regularly report these emissions to the UNFCCC, and that the IMO regularly updates the
UNFCCC on its activities to address them, demonstrates the understanding of states that
addressing these emissions is also within the legal purview of the UNFCCC, such that if the IMO
failed to address them, the UNFCCC could; it also underscores the need and competence of the
IMO to do so. The Paris Agreement did not specifically mention the maritime transport sector but
it did provide a new urgency to the requirement to reduce all emissions, from all sectors.

2.4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
UNCLOS codified the rights and responsibilities of countries with regard to the world’s
oceans.9 It is not primarily aimed at regulating shipping but there are substantial sections that
overlap with IMO regulations. When UNCLOS was being drafted, IMO regulations in existence at
that time were taken into account and the IMO is referred to several times within UNCLOS
(usually by referring to the “competent international organization”).10
The IMO has considered the interaction between UNCLOS and IMO’s mandate and
competence and found that “[w]hile UNCLOS defines the features and extent of the concepts of
flag, coastal and port state jurisdiction, IMO instruments specify how state jurisdiction should be
exercised to ensure compliance with safety and anti-pollution shipping regulations.”11
'Good Practice Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National Greenhouse Gas Inventories'
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2000) <https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gp/english/>
accessed 18 May 2018.
8 International Bunker Fuels Under the SBSTA, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)' (Unfccc.int, 2018) <https://unfccc.int/topics/mitigation/workstreams/emissions-frominternational-transport-bunker-fuels/bunkers-under-sbsta> accessed 18 May 2018.
9United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1958.
10 UNCLOS incorporated all existing international multilateral and bilateral treaties and customary
international law with regard to the oceans. The International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
and the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL 54 – a
predecessor to MARPOL) were duly taken into consideration.
11 For a full discussion of the interaction between UNCLOS and the IMO, see: 'Implications of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization (IMO 2014)
<http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Legal/Documents/LEG%20MISC%208.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018.
7
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The definition of pollution in Article 1 of UNCLOS includes “substances or energy…which
results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life,
hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities.” CO2 emissions must be included in this
as they will increase ocean acidification, which has a deleterious effect on marine life, and increase
extreme weather, which will be a hindrance to maritime trade. UNCLOS elaborately deals with
vessel-source pollution in Article 211 where states are obliged to create international regulations
for the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution by vessels in the marine environment.
Articles 212 and 222 specifically deal with atmospheric pollution. Article 212 provides states with
jurisdiction to take action against shipping-generated atmospheric pollution, which is subject to
international rules and standards. Similarly, Article 222 of UNCLOS imposes an obligation on
states to implement and enforce international rules and standards for the prevention of vesselsource

atmospheric

pollution,

which

are

developed

through

competent

international

organizations. All of this is supported by Article 194, which calls for the use of “all measures
consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment from any source.” These provisions underscore that from the perspective of
international law and institutions, while UNCLOS may also have competence to address
greenhouse gases, UNCLOS Parties look to other “competent international organizations” –
including and especially IMO – to do so.

3. IMO LEGAL COMPETENCE ON ECONOMIC MEASURES
As noted above, Article 2 of the IMO Convention confers extremely broad powers on the
Organization to act to address marine pollution. They are not limited to certain types of measures,
and the IMO Convention places no restriction on the IMO agreeing to measures that would raise
money or set up an independent body. Indeed, the article specifically authorizes the IMO to
“perform functions” and draft conventions, agreements or other suitable instruments arising in
connection with these. It thus provides the legal basis by which the IMO may establish and
administer economic measures and/or independent bodies.

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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3.1 Part XIII of the IMO Convention
It might be argued that the IMO Convention Part XIII limits the ability of the IMO to
implement economic measures. Part XIII sets out that each delegation shall pay for their own
delegation’s expenses; that the IMO Assembly shall be responsible for approving the budget of the
IMO; and that if a state’s contribution is a year overdue, its voting rights will be suspended.
Consequently, Part XIII simply sets out how the IMO should conduct its internal administration in
relation to the IMO’s operating budget12 and says nothing in relation to whether or not the MEPC
or the Organization itself is empowered to adopt instruments establishing economic measures to
achieve their aims.13
It could be argued that these are the only express financial powers the IMO has, but this
cannot be the case, considering that the wording in relation to adopting measures on maritime
pollution is so broad, and nowhere in the Convention is it stated that the powers listed in Part XIII
are the only financial rules the IMO can adopt. If the administrative and budgetary powers in Part
XIII were the only financial powers of the IMO, that would have to be expressly stated in order to
override the wide powers that are clearly expressed. Therefore, it is not correct to interpret articles
that relate to the organization of the IMO’s internal finances as limiting the measures the IMO
could implement to reduce shipping’s climate change impact. Part XIII relates to the functions of
the Secretariat of the IMO but does not relate to the remit of the IMO Convention.
Nowhere in the Convention is there a limit placed upon the types of instruments that can
be enacted by the members of the IMO. Therefore, the only legal limit upon what measures can be
agreed at the IMO is the agreement of the members themselves. States came together to form the

Part XIII states in full: “Article 58: Each Member shall bear the salary, travel and other expenses of its own
delegation to the meetings held by the Organization. Article 59: The Council shall consider the financial
statements and budget estimates prepared by the Secretary-General and submit them to the Assembly with
its comments and recommendations. Article 60: (a) Subject to any agreement between the Organization and
the United Nations, the Assembly shall review and approve the budget estimates. (b) The Assembly shall
apportion the expenses among the Members in accordance with a scale to be fixed by it after consideration of
the proposals of the Council thereon. Article 61: Any Member which fails to discharge its financial obligation
to the Organization within one year from the date on which it is due shall have no vote in the Assembly, the
Council, the Maritime Safety Committee, the Legal Committee, the Marine Environment Protection
Committee, the Technical Co-operation Committee or the Facilitation Committee unless the Assembly, at its
discretion, waives this provision.”
13 Convention on the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 1948, Articles 58-61.
12
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Organization in order to gain the benefits of working together across the international maritime
sector. If the members of the Organization now agree that in order to reduce the impact of the
maritime sector on the climate, the IMO should establish an economic measure or an independent
body, there is nothing in the Convention preventing this.
Indeed, the IMO has already established an economic measure and an independent body:
the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution and subsequent Conventions.14 This shows that the IMO members
interpreted the IMO Convention to give them the power to establish economic measures (the IOPC
Fund collects revenues and distributes them in relation to oil spills) and establish an independent
body.15
However, the establishment of an international fund requires political will, not only the
legal feasibility to do so. Each country should be ready for any new IMO rules, which can be a
challenge with regard to setting up national legislation, securing resources for enforcement and
gaining the necessary expertise. The 1996 International Convention on Liability and Compensation
for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS)
provided the opportunity to create an international fund, however political will for the convention
as a whole was lacking, resulting in a low rate of ratification and ultimately the HNS Convention
being superseded by a Protocol in 2010.16

3.2 Comparison with Aviation
In 2016, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted a resolution
establishing the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), a

IOPC Funds, About Us' (Iopcfunds.org, 2018) <http://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/> accessed 18 May
2018; For example the Fund Convention,1992 and the Supplementary Fund Protocol, 2003. Though the 71
Fund Convention has now been wound down and replaced by the 1992 Fund Convention and 2003
Supplementary Fund Protocol.
15 Of course there are differences between a fund that could be established for climate purposes and the
IPOC, as the IOPC was created to deal with liability and compensation of victims of oil pollution as opposed
to for the purpose of encouraging environmentally responsible behavior. In addition, it is imposed not on
ships, but on cargo interests. However there is no reason that the IMO can create a fund for one reason and
not the other.
16 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), 1996.
14
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market based measure. 17 ICAO’s foundational document, the 1944 Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation, 18 contains no express provision allowing ICAO to adopt any
particular economic measure. But Article 37 of the Chicago Convention authorizes ICAO to adopt
international standards and recommended practices (SARPs) addressing, inter alia, matters
concerning the safety and efficiency of air navigation. After ICAO’s Assembly of Member States
adopted a resolution establishing global aspirational goals for addressing greenhouse gas
emissions as an essential element of promoting the sustainable growth of international aviation,
the Assembly then expressly recognized a market-based measure to reduce emissions as a
necessary element of a broader set of measures to help it achieve these goals. This provided the
foundation for ICAO member states to come together and formally request ICAO’s Council to
develop and adopt the SARPs, in effect exercising the authority provided under Article 37. This is
a direct parallel with the IMO, as the IMO has no express authorization for agreeing to an
economic measure but can do so, as ICAO has done. Arguably, the IMO is on even surer footing
than ICAO would be as the IMO has express authority to adopt measures to deal with “marine
pollution,” unlike ICAO which adopted measures to deal with aviation greenhouse gas emissions
under the guise of matters concerning the safety and efficiency of air navigation.

3.3 The Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC)
Article 37 of the IMO Convention establishes the MEPC as a committee of the IMO that
includes all Members of the IMO.19 Article 38 states MEPC’s purposes, which are (among others)
to:
consider any matter within the scope of the Organization concerned with the
prevention and control of marine pollution from ships and in particular shall:
(a) Perform such functions as are or may be conferred upon the Organization by or
under international conventions for the prevention and control of marine pollution
from ships . . .

'What Are The Mechanisms For The CORSIA Implementation? How Will ICAO Support States To
Implement The CORSIA?' (Icao.int, 2018) <https://www.icao.int/environmentalprotection/Pages/A39_CORSIA_FAQ4.aspx> accessed 18 May 2018.
18 'Convention On International Civil Aviation - Doc 7300' (Icao.int, 2018)
<https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx> accessed 18 May 2018.
19 Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 1948, Article 37.
17
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(e) Consider and take appropriate action with respect to any other matters falling
within the scope of the Organization which would contribute to the prevention and
control of marine pollution from ships including co-operation on environmental
matters with other international organizations.20
There is no express or implied limit upon the powers of MEPC in this Article other than that it
cannot act on measures falling outside the competence of the IMO (and the broad competence of
the IMO is dealt with above). The language on its face is broad enough to allow the MEPC to
consider and act in any way the committee deems appropriate upon any matter falling within the
scope of the Organization which would contribute to the prevention and control of marine
pollution from ships, including greenhouse gases.
The MEPC considers itself to be exercising competence under Article 38(a) in considering
greenhouse gases measures. 21 It specifically has recognized UNCLOS, as an international
convention conferring functions upon the IMO relating to the protection and preservation of the
marine environment.22 In addition, the broad language of Article 2 requires the IMO to “provide
for the drafting of conventions, agreements, or other suitable instruments, and recommend these to
governments and to intergovernmental organizations… Perform functions arising in connection
with [these].” These provisions demonstrate that Article 38(a)’s enumeration of specific functions
that MEPC must fulfill in no way restricts what functions the MEPC may fulfill – including
establishing independent bodies and the institution of economic measures that can perform
functions delegated to them under the instruments that the MEPC adopts.23

4. POSSIBLE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
The IMO has the power to adopt economic instruments and establish new bodies to deal
with greenhouse gases from international shipping. Climate measures should be legally binding,
enforceable and implemented on a global scale as quickly as possible, as the climate crisis is
urgent. The question arises whether a new treaty needs to be established to do so; whether an
Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 1948, Article 38.
Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 1948, Article 38.
22 International Maritime Organization, Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
for the International Maritime Organization’' (2014) Available at
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Legal/Documents/LEG%20MISC%208.pdf accessed on 12 June 2018.
23 Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 1948, Article 38.
20
21
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existing treaty could be amended for the purpose; or whether the purpose could be accomplished
through the adoption of a different “suitable instrument,” in the words of Article 2 of the
Convention.
This is an important question: the IMO has calculated that the average period from a
decision to develop a new IMO treaty until it enters into force is 7.3 years.24 This time period
depends on several factors but one of the most important will be the requirements that are agreed
at the time of adoption for entry into force – i.e. the number of states and percentage of tonnage
that are required to ratify the instrument before it enters into force (more below on this point).
Meanwhile, discussions in the IMO on the climate impact of shipping have been taking place since
1997 and the climate challenge is becoming ever more urgent. Amending an existing treaty, or
adopting another suitable instrument or treaty that has minimal ratification requirements before
entering into force, is therefore preferable.
The IMO recognizes this with the consideration of short term (among other) measures as
part of the Initial Greenhouse Gas Strategy which could include economic measures (e.g. the
existing fleet renewal program). While there is not yet an agreed date by which these short term
measures would come into force, in order for them to operate in the “short term” under any
reasonable meaning of that term in relation to the climate challenge, those policies would have to
be operational within a couple of years, thus precluding the time required to adopt a new treaty.
Each of the potential legal instruments below will be considered with the urgency of the climate
crisis in mind.

4.1 A New IMO Treaty or Convention to Regulate Greenhouse Gases25
In the broad powers already discussed in Article 2, the IMO Convention gives the IMO the
power to propose new treaties for adoption. The MEPC is further empowered to be the forum for
these treaties to be discussed, by virtue of the broad powers provided to that committee in Article
38. However, as discussed above, the average time for treaties to enter into force is 7.3 years. which
is too slow from a climate perspective. One of the main reasons for this length of time is the

MEPC 61/Inf.2 'Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Ships', (International Maritime Organisation
2010) <https://docs.imo.org/Search.aspx?keywords=mepc%2061%2Finf.2> accessed 18 May 2018.
25 For the purposes of this paper there is no material difference between a treaty or convention and the terms
are used interchangeably.
24
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requirements that are agreed at the time of adoption for entry into force – i.e. the number of states
and percentage of tonnage that are required to ratify the instrument before it enters into force. For
example, the IMO Convention itself required “21 States, of which seven shall each have a total
tonnage of not less than 1,000,000 gross tons of shipping”26 to become parties to the Convention
before the Convention entered into force. Since that time, it has been the practice of the IMO
members when agreeing the text of a new treaty to include provisions in relation to the number of
states and associated shipping tonnage required before that new treaty can come into force. Most
treaties now require a certain percentage of the world tonnage to enter into force (e.g. Ballast Water
Management Convention required 30 states representing 35% of the world’s merchant tonnage27)
rather than a specified amount of tonnage as in the IMO Convention. However, with 75% of the
world tonnage shared between just five states, this can mean that it can take a long time to meet
the percentage tonnage required for a treaty to enter into force.28
Importantly, nothing in the IMO Convention requires the IMO member states to set a
particular tonnage or number of states before a new treaty could enter into force. Article 2(b) of the
IMO Convention specifies that in order to achieve the purposes of the Organization, the IMO shall
“[p]rovide for the drafting of conventions, agreements, or other suitable instruments, and
recommend these to Governments and to intergovernmental organizations, and convene such
conferences as may be necessary.” There are no caveats or limitations accompanying this power,
e.g. there is nowhere in the Convention which states that the drafting of new conventions must
provide for a certain tonnage of world shipping to agree before the convention could enter into
force. Indeed, this is reflected in the fact that over time the requirements have been changed as
stated above. Therefore, if the members of the IMO decide that a new treaty is the most
appropriate way forward, they should be mindful of the urgency of the climate crisis and require a
low number of states and tonnage before the treaty enters into force. However, the impact and

Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 1948, Article 79.
The International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments
(Ballast Water Management Convention) 2004.
28 'Flag State 2016 / 2017: Top 10 Ship Registers' (Lloyd's List, 2017)
<https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/infographics/flag-state-2016--2017-top-10-ship-registers>
accessed 18 May 2018.
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generally accepted viability of such a treaty with low state and tonnage participation to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions may be questioned if major shipping countries do not ratify the treaty.
An important point to note here is that any new regulation dealing with greenhouse gases
must contain the principle of “no more favorable treatment” (NMFT), to ensure adequate political
capital behind an agreement. This is a standard principle in the IMO, included in most regulations
to ensure they can be effective without worldwide ratification.29 NMFT requires that any country
which is a party to a particular treaty must apply the rules of that treaty to all the ships that stop in
that country’s ports, regardless of the flag of that ship. That includes ships that are flying the flag
of a country which is not a party to the particular instrument. For example MARPOL Article 5(4)
requires that “with respect to the ship of non-Parties to the Convention, Parties shall apply the
requirements of the present Convention as may be necessary to ensure that no more favourable
treatment is given to such ships.” An example of this principle being applied can be seen in the
guidelines on compliance with the Ballast Water Management (BWM) Convention by the U.S.
Coast Guard to U.S. flagged ships which states, “The U.S. is not signatory to the BWM Convention,
and the Coast Guard cannot mandate compliance with the BWM Convention’s requirements either
for U.S. flagged vessels or for foreign vessels operating on the navigable waters of the United
States. In contrast, the parties to the BWM Convention are required to impose BWM Convention
requirements on all Party and non-Party vessels when calling on their ports (Article 3, Paragraph 3:
“no more favorable treatment clause”). U.S. flagged vessels operating in a party’s waters should be
prepared to demonstrate compliance with the BWM Convention or be at risk for Port State Control
actions, including detention.”30 The application of NMFT will mean that if an economic instrument
is established, the countries which decide to participate will be able to ensure there is no market
distortion for any ships calling at their ports. This will also create pressure for other countries to
sign up to the convention as in order to call at the ports of countries that have signed up, any ship
would have to comply with the provisions of the new convention or be able to show that they had

For example. The International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and
Sediments (Ballast Water Management Convention) 2004 and the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978, Annex VI.
30 United States Coast Guard, Guidelines for Volunatry Compliance with the International Convention for
the Control and Management of Ship’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004, 16711/Serial No. 1502 CG-CVC
Policy Letter 17-05 September 6, 2017.
29
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done so. Depending on what the final measure agreed is, this could be done in a number of ways.
For example, if there was a levy placed on the sale of fuel, a ship calling into a port of a country
which had signed up to the measure would have to show that they had paid the levy when they
last bunkered, or alternatively could pay the equivalent price upon calling at the port of the
country that is a member of the convention.

4.2 Adopting an Agreement or Other Suitable Instrument
Article 2(b) of the IMO Convention refers to the drafting of “conventions, agreements or
other suitable instruments.” Again, as stated, this is a very broad power and no limitations are
provided in the Convention upon what or how these mentioned agreements or other suitable
instruments could be agreed. If the IMO decides to adopt an agreement or “other suitable
instrument” (rather than establishing a new convention or amending an existing convention) then
it will be important that the IMO ensures that the requirements for that instrument to enter into
force are reasonable enough to ensure that the climate crisis doesn’t worsen before it becomes
operational. One potential way to do it would be to adopt an instrument that does not require
ratification (the Paris Agreement is an example of this type of instrument). However, parties must
be mindful to ensure that there are appropriate enforcement and implementation provisions to
ensure that parties to the Agreement comply so that the objectives of the treaty can actually be
achieved. Therefore, a non-enforceable instrument along the lines of the Paris Agreement would
not be suitable. The IMO has a number of treaties already existing which are built around the
principle of NFMT, which ensures that they can be enforced against not only the ships of the
parties to the particular treaty but also against any ships calling at those parties ports – regardless
as to whether the flag state of that ship is a party to the particular treaty. MARPOL is one of those
treaties and its suitability will be discussed below.

4.3 Amending an Existing Instrument: MARPOL
The MARPOL Convention was adopted on 2 November 1973. The Protocol of 1978 was
adopted in response to a spate of tanker accidents in 1976-1977. At that time, the 1973 MARPOL
Convention had not yet entered into force, so the 1978 MARPOL Protocol absorbed the parent
Convention. The combined instrument entered into force on 2 October 1983. The combined
instrument was originally conceived to minimize the discharge at sea of oil, noxious liquid
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substances, sewage, and garbage – each under a separate Annex. Each Annex requires individual
ratification by countries so that a country could ratify Annex IV on sewage but not Annex V on
garbage if they so choose. In 1997, a Protocol was adopted to amend the Convention and a new
Annex VI was added which entered into force on 19 May 2005 to limit air pollutants from ships.
Annex VI was amended to include some climate measures in 201131: the Energy Efficiency Design
Index (EEDI) and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) which are technical
requirements placed upon ships (via their flag states signing up to the relevant MARPOL
regulations) to increase energy efficiency in order to address greenhouse gas emissions. Annex VI
was further amended in 2016 to include the Data Collection System which requires ships to
monitor and report their fuel oil consumption to their flag state on an annual basis.32
4.3.1 The Governing Principles of MARPOL
MARPOL is an instrument that focuses on technical and operational measures and has an
enforcement system to match. While an economic measure or the establishment of a new body
would not be a new departure for the IMO, it would be a new departure within MARPOL but not
beyond the competence set out in MARPOL’s governing principles. Article 1 of MARPOL sets out
its purpose, which is that “the Parties to the Convention undertake to give effect to the provisions
of the present Convention and those Annexes thereto by which they are bound, in order to prevent
the pollution of the marine environment by the discharge of harmful substances or effluents
containing such substances in contravention of the Convention.” There is no restriction in
MARPOL on the type of measure that can be contained within it. To date it has included
operational and technical measures but there is no legal reason why this could not be expanded to
include an economic measure or the establishment of an independent body. Indeed, there is a
provision for financial compensation for ships under Article 7 of MARPOL where ships are unduly
delayed as a result of the enforcement of the Convention.
4.3.2 MARPOL Regulates Countries (Not Ships)
The parties to MARPOL are countries. These countries then apply the regulations in
MARPOL to ships. Article 5(4) of MARPOL refines this by stating that it applies not only to ships
31
32

See MARPOL Annex VI Chapter 4.
See MARPOL Annex VI, Regulation 22A.
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which are flagged in one of the countries that are a signatories to MARPOL, but also that countries
that are signatories to MARPOL can apply MARPOL regulations to ships that are flagged in other
countries as well.

This is the principle of ‘NMFT’ as discussed above. However, the actual

obligations imposed by MARPOL apply to countries and not ships, as Article 1 states, “the Parties
to the Convention undertake to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and those
Annexes thereto.” Indeed, Regulation 18 of Annex VI requires all states to ensure the availability
of fuel oils compliant with MARPOL rules at ports and terminals. MARPOL usually requires
certificates as proof of compliance (though Annex III and V do not have a certificate regime and
use other means). Article 5 of MARPOL provides for ships to hold certificates “in accordance with
the provisions of the regulations.” Whether certificates would be appropriate means of compliance
with an economic measure depends on the specific design of the measure (for example if a fuel
levy was imposed, this could be evidenced by a certificate received upon purchase of fuel and
payment of the levy). Parties could even agree to new provisions of the Convention that did not
primarily apply to ships (e.g. that all members of the Convention must charge a levy on all
shipping fuel sold in their territory and remit that levy to the IMO or other designated recipients,
or agree to the establishment of an independent body). There is nothing in MARPOL which
restricts the design of measures to only apply to ships or to have a compliance regime based upon
certificates (as long as the existing provisions of the Convention are not contradicted).
Once it has been established that MARPOL can be amended to include any necessary
measures, there are several methods of doing so that must be considered. In order to introduce an
economic measure into MARPOL, there are three options: amending an already existing chapter
within a MARPOL Annex, introducing a new chapter into an existing MARPOL Annex or creating
an entirely new MARPOL Annex.
4.3.3 Amending a Current MARPOL Annex
Article 16 of MARPOL sets out two restrictions upon amendments to the Convention. The
first is in Article 16(6), which requires that any amendment which relates to the structure of a ship
shall only apply to ships for which the building contract is agreed or, if no building contract, the
keel laid, after the date on which the amendment comes into force, unless expressly provided
otherwise. This should not affect any economic measures or the establishment of an independent
body.
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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The second restriction is in Article 16(7), which states that any amendment to MARPOL
“shall relate to the substance of that Protocol or Annex and shall be consistent with the
articles of the present Convention.” Firstly, there is no reason to suppose that any economic
measure would conflict with the existing provisions of MARPOL, and care could be taken to
ensure during drafting that it did not conflict. The parties to MARPOL are the ultimate arbiters of
whether something relates to the substance of the Protocol and is consistent with the Convention.
The IMO has now agreed to three measures in relation to greenhouse gases from international
shipping and all three sit in MARPOL Annex VI. However, Annex VI when originally adopted in
1997 concerned only traditional air pollutants, i.e. sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrous oxides (NOx),
deliberate emissions of ozone depleting substances (ODS), volatile organic compounds (VOC) and
also regulated shipboard incineration. Annex VI was expanded first in 2011 to include greenhouse
gases from shipping via the adoption of the EEDI and the SEEMP.33 This expanded the scope of the
Annex to include greenhouse gases – emissions of an entirely different order from those Annex VI
originally regulated, i.e. those that caused direct harm to human health (ozone harms human
health by depleting the ozone which increases the reach of harmful rays which can cause cancer) –
to emissions that do not harm human health as directly but do affect the climate.
MARPOL originally only regulated discharges into the sea of oil, noxious liquid substances,
sewage, and garbage but not any discharges into the air. The introduction of Annex VI was the
first time air pollution was regulated under MARPOL and was regarded by the parties to
MARPOL as relating to the substance of the Convention and consistent with its articles. On this
basis, it seems that there is no reason to suppose that agreeing to an economic measure or
independent body to further deal with greenhouse gases from shipping would conflict with the
substance of MARPOL, as long as the parties agree to it. The parties to Annex VI already decided
that greenhouse gases were close enough to traditional air pollutants that amending Annex VI to
include greenhouse gases created no conflict, so there is no reason why they cannot decide that
agreeing an economic measure to regulate greenhouse gases does not also relate to the substance
of MARPOL.

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), 1973, Annex VI amended
2011.
33
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4.3.4 The Procedure for Amending MARPOL
Article 16 of MARPOL sets out two procedures for amending the Convention. These could
be characterized as the “rejected unless accepted” procedure (the explicit amendment procedure)
or the “accepted unless rejected” procedure (the tacit amendment procedure). For all amendments,
Article 16(2)(a) requires the proposed amendment to be circulated six months before consideration
by the IMO to all parties.
The ‘rejected unless accepted’ or ‘explicit’ procedure outlined in Article 16(2)(d) states the
amendment can be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the parties to the Convention (or particular
Annex in question) who are present and voting, in MEPC unless a specific Conference of the
parties was called under Article 16(3) of MARPOL. Following this, the amendment will be deemed
to be accepted via Article 16(2)(f)(i), which requires acceptance by two thirds of the parties (to the
Convention or the particular Annex as relevant), which make up 50% of the gross tonnage of the
world’s merchant fleet.
The ‘accepted unless rejected’ or ‘tacit’ procedure is laid out in Article 16(2)(f)(ii) and (iii).34
It states that an amendment to a MARPOL Annex shall be deemed to have been accepted at the
end of a period (of at least 10 months) to be determined by the MEPC or Conference of the parties,
unless one third of the parties, making up 50% of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant fleet
object to the amendment. Parties can also declare that their express consent is required for the
adoption of the amendment. Under Article 16(2)(g)(ii), the amendment then enters into force six

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), 1973, Article 16(2)(f)(ii)
and (iii) state: “(ii) an amendment to an Annex to the Convention shall be deemed to have been
accepted in accordance with the procedure specified in subparagraph (f)(iii) unless the appropriate
body, at the time of its adoption, determines that the amendment shall be deemed to have been
accepted on the date on which it is accepted by two thirds of the Parties, the combined merchant
fleets of which constitute not less than 50 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant
fleet. Nevertheless, at any time before the entry into force of an amendment to an Annex to the
Convention, a Party may notify the Secretary-General of the Organization that its express approval
will be necessary before the amendment enters into force for it. The latter shall bring such
notification and the date of its receipt to the notice of Parties;
(iii) an amendment to an appendix to an Annex to the Convention shall be deemed to have been
accepted at the end of a period to be determined by the appropriate body at the time of its
adoption, which period shall be not less than ten months, unless within that period an objection is
communicated to the Organization by not less than one third of the Parties or by the Parties the
combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than 50 per cent of the gross tonnage of the
world's merchant fleet whichever condition is fulfilled;”
34
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months after the end of the period as determined by the appropriate body, but not for those parties
which reject the amendment during the time set out by the appropriate body or who declared that
their express consent is required.
The authority to decide which amendment procedure is used is given to the MEPC or
Conference of the Parties under Article 16(f) – this is a political decision and not a legal one, as long
as the limits upon amendments as set out in section 4.3.3 above are observed. There are no further
legal limits on using the tacit acceptance procedure in the MARPOL Convention itself and it can be
used for amending existing Annexes or adding new chapters to Annexes, as long as the MEPC (or
specific Conference of the Parties) so decides.
At first glance, for those unfamiliar with the IMO or other international forums, it might
seem that there is little difference between the two procedures – both essentially require two thirds
of countries to agree to the amendment. But there is a large difference between requiring explicit
and implicit consent of countries. While countries might vote for a measure in MEPC (regardless of
which procedure is required all amendments require the consent of at least two thirds of the
present and voting parties, though in practice the IMO rarely calls for a vote and usually proceeds
by consensus), getting a country to submit a formal acceptance of an amendment to the IMO can
be a long drawn out process and essentially leads to the same delay on measures entering into
force that new conventions also experience. Thus, it is essential that if any measure is to be
implemented at a speed which will be able to adequately deal with the climate crisis, it is adopted
via the tacit amendment procedure. Adopting amendments to MARPOL via the tacit amendment
procedure is completely within the authority of the MEPC and they must exercise it for any IMO
climate measures the committee deems necessary to ensure that the goals of the IMO’s initial
greenhouses gas strategy agreed in April 2018 are met.
4.3.5 Adding a New Chapter to a MARPOL Annex
In 2011, Resolution MEPC.203(62) added a new chapter 4 entitled "Regulations on energy
efficiency for ships" to Annex VI of MARPOL. A new chapter could again be added to Annex VI to
include new economic measures and the establishment of an independent advisory body. There is
no limitation in MARPOL which would restrict this, and the tacit amendment procedure can be
used. It is important to note that while the IMO usually proceeds by consensus, the rules for
amendments (discussed above) provide for voting. This is only used if called for by a delegation
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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and only for controversial topics. Saudi Arabia called for vote on the adoption of the EEDI and
SEEMP.35 Only those IMO members which were members to Annex VI were entitled to vote. At
the time 59 IMO members who were signatories to Annex VI were present and so entitled to vote,
and an overwhelming 49 of those members (about 83%) voted in favor of the measures. These
measures remain mandatory against those parties which voted against the amendments, the
countries that do not wish to comply with the amendments must lodge a formal objection to the
amendment with the IMO Secretariat or if the tacit amendment procedure has been used, require
that their specific consent is required before the amendments apply to them. As of June 2018, there
are now 91 members of Annex VI entitled to vote on any amendments to that Annex.36
4.3.6 Creating a New MARPOL Annex
As stated above, MARPOL was originally adopted in 1973 but was amended in 1978 to
become known as ‘MARPOL 73/78’. Originally Annexes I and II were obligatory annexes that
countries had to become signatories to when they ratified the overarching MARPOL 73/78 text.
The Annexes III-V, which were adopted later, are optional and can be signed up to individually by
countries so that countries can be signatories to one Annex but not necessarily all (with the
exception of Annexes I and II). MARPOL Article 16(5) provides that an entirely new annex would
follow the same procedure as for the adoption and entry into force of an amendment to an article
of the Convention. This means that, as per Article 16(2)(f)(i) an amendment shall be deemed to
have been accepted on the date on which it is accepted by two thirds majority of the parties and
the combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than 50 per cent of the gross tonnage of
the world’s merchant fleet. Every new annex requires individual ratification and there is no
provision in the Convention for countries which have signed up to the Convention or Annex(es) to
automatically become parties to a new annex. Therefore, it must be assumed that adopting an
entirely new annex to MARPOL would suffer from the same disadvantages that an entirely new

http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Technical-andOperational-Measures.aspx.
36 Status of Treaties (IMO 2018)
<http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/StatusOfTreaties.pdf>
accessed 18 May 2018.
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convention would – it could take a long time for the required number of country ratifications for
that annex to come into force.

5. CONCLUSION
The IMO has the power to regulate the climate impacts of international shipping through
the powers conferred on it by the IMO Convention. Steps taken by the parties to the UNFCCC,
including Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol, confirm the understanding of nations that IMO has
authority to address climate issues. Nowhere are any of IMO’s powers limited specifically to noneconomic measures, nor is the establishment of an independent body prohibited. Similarly, there is
nothing in MARPOL which restricts that Convention to non-economic measures, or prohibits the
establishment of an independent body. As long as IMO members follow the correct procedures to
amend MARPOL, then by virtue of the fact that the members voted to create an economic
instrument under MARPOL, the measure can be created. The only explicit limits upon
amendments to MARPOL are that they should relate to the substance of that Protocol or Annex in
MARPOL and must be consistent with the articles of MARPOL. There is no reason to suppose that
an amendment to MARPOL that includes economic measures or an independent body to advise on
the climate trajectory for shipping would not be consistent with the substance of MARPOL.
Further, MARPOL contains two procedures for amendment: the tacit or accepted unless rejected
procedure and the explicit or rejected unless accepted procedure. There are no legal limits placed
upon the use of the tacit procedure to amend existing Annexes, rather the use or otherwise of that
procedure is political decision for the MEPC (or a specific Conference of the Parties if called).
The climate crisis has been discussed in the IMO for over 20 years and is now urgent. The
IMO must act immediately to introduce measures so that investments can be made in low and zero
greenhouse gas emissions solutions at scale and international shipping’s contribution to climate
change can begin to reduce. There is simply no legal reason not to do so; the only things required
are an effective strategy and the political will to enact it. This paper has set out how the IMO has
the power to do so and to do so quickly, without the need for an entirely new Convention. Climate
measures can and should be agreed quickly through the tacit amendment procedure to Annex VI
of MARPOL.
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